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Abstract
Research spanning multiple domains of psychology has demonstrated preferential processing of 
animate as compared to inanimate entities—a pattern that is commonly explained as due to 
evolutionarily adaptive behavior. Forces of nature represent a class of entities that are semantically 
inanimate but which behave as if they are animate in that they possess the ability to initiate 
movement and cause actions. We report an eye-tracking experiment demonstrating that natural 
forces are processed like animate entities during online sentence processing: they are easier to 
integrate with action verbs than instruments, and this effect is mediated by sentence structure. The 
results suggest that many cognitive and linguistic phenomena that have previously been attributed 
to animacy may be more appropriately attributed to perceived agency. To the extent that this is so, 
the cognitive potency of animate entities may not be due to vigilant monitoring of the environment 
for unpredictable events as argued by evolutionary psychologists but instead may be more 
adequately explained as reflecting a cognitive and linguistic focus on causal explanations that is 
adaptive because it increases the predictability of events.
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The fundamental distinction between animate and inanimate entities is regarded as an 
important factor in language and cognitive processing. In language research, animacy is 
considered a linguistic universal (Comrie, 1989)—one that powerfully affects the acquisition 
of grammatical knowledge (Brown, 1973), the process of sentence comprehension (Clifton, 
Traxler, Mohamed, Williams, Morris, & Rayner, 2003), and the degree of language 
impairment in patients with aphasia and other neuropsychological conditions (Capitani, 
Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003). For cognition more generally, animate stimuli 
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capture visual attention more quickly and hold attention longer than inanimate stimuli 
(Abrams & Christ, 2003; Johansson, 1973; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 2010). The 
distinction between animate and inanimate is a critical component of semantic knowledge 
(Caramazza & Mahon, 2003), emerges early in development (Opfer & Gelman, 2011), and 
is associated with distinct patterns of brain activation (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Gobbini 
et al., 2011). Finally, words or pictures representing animate entities are better remembered 
than those representing inanimate entities (Bonin, Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2013; Nairne, 
VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill, & LeBreton, 2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & 
Cogdill, 2014).
Findings showing the importance of animacy are frequently explained from an evolutionary 
psychology perspective (e.g., animate monitoring hypothesis; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2007). Given that our primitive ancestors were primarily concerned with survival, the ability 
to rapidly detect animals in the visual field and determine whether they were potential 
predators or prey would seem to be a highly advantageous skill. In addition, survival and 
reproduction likely depended on the ability to remember which humans were friends, 
enemies, or potential mates. More generally, New et al. argue that the behavior of humans 
and animals is largely unpredictable, which would have made it especially advantageous for 
our ancestors to carefully monitor the location of animate entities more so than inanimate 
entities (like tools) that typically remained stationary. In other words, animate entities are 
capable of independent movement, can suddenly change course without warning, and 
occasionally initiate violent actions that result in destruction, injury, or death, all of which 
are argued to have contributed to an evolutionarily advantageous focus on animate entities.
While many cognitive and linguistic phenomena have been cited as showing the importance 
of animacy, animacy per se may not be the critical factor. Natural forces are semantically 
inanimate (nonliving), but behave in ways that are more similar to animates than inanimates 
in that they are able to initiate movement, change course without warning, and occasionally 
cause destruction, injury, and death. Accounts of evolutionary psychology cite extreme 
climate and natural disasters as important factors that likely shaped the prehistoric evolution 
of human behavior (Buss, 1991, 2009). Recorded history on supernatural beliefs found from 
classical mythology to modern religion provides ample evidence that humans are inclined to 
attribute volitional characteristics to inanimate forces of nature just as they do to animate 
entities (Guthrie, 1993). This suggests that cognitive focus may be guided by the perceived 
agency of an entity rather than its animacy, and further, that the cognitive potency of 
animate entities is not solely due to processes that vigilantly monitor the environment for 
unpredictable events but instead depends in very important ways on processes involved in 
creating causal explanations that are adaptive because they increase the predictability of 
events.
Analyses of language further indicate that this focus on the causal explanations of events is 
linguistically encoded in the basic processes that govern how subjects and verbs combine in 
sentences. Standard linguistic accounts (Chomsky, 1981) propose that a verb assigns 
thematic roles, which specify semantically how the arguments introduced by noun phrases 
combine with the actions introduced by the verb. For example, a verb like injure assigns the 
thematic role of “agent” to its subject, which requires that the subject be animate (1a). If 
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instead the subject is inanimate (1b), it may still be possible to understand the sentence, but 
processing is made more difficult (Lowder & Gordon, 2012).
(1a) The criminal injured the farmer in the field beside the barn.
(1b) The revolver injured the farmer in the field beside the barn.
This difficulty with inanimate subject-verb integration may result from additional processing 
required in assigning a less-preferred instrument role to the subject (Cruse, 1973; Fillmore, 
1968; Schlesinger, 1989). However, Dowty (1991) has argued that discrete thematic role 
categories, such as agent and instrument, should be replaced by the notion of a Proto-Agent. 
Under this account, the Proto-Agent possesses the properties that are typically associated 
with thematic agents (i.e., volition, sentience, ability to change the state of another entity, 
movement), and a verb may assign an argument the Proto-Agent role to the extent that it 
resembles the prototype. Thus, it is possible for animate entities, natural forces, and 
instruments to participate in an event as Proto-Agents, but their degree of fit with this 
category may vary. From this perspective, the animacy of an entity referred to by a noun is 
less important than its perceived agency—the degree to which it is conceptualized as 
possessing the ability to initiate actions. A similar perspective comes from Wolff and 
colleagues (Wolff, Jeon, Klettke, & Li, 2010; Wolff, Jeon, & Li, 2009), who have proposed 
that the difficulty of interpreting a causal construction involving an inanimate subject 
depends on the entity’s inherent ability to generate its own energy. Under this account, 
inanimate entities lie on a continuum of force creation. On one end are natural forces (e.g., 
hurricanes, earthquakes, rivers), which are fully capable of creating their own energy. On the 
other end are instruments, tools, and weapons, which derive their energy from an animate 
agent, and therefore may not easily combine with an action verb.
Consistent with the notion that animacy influences the process of subject-verb integration, 
we have shown using eye-tracking that readers experience greater processing difficulty in 
sentences like (1b) than in sentences like (1a), where the action verb is the main verb of the 
sentence. However, when the action verb is embedded in a relative clause (1c & 1d), the 
animacy effect is substantially reduced (Lowder & Gordon, 2012).
(1c) The criminal that injured the farmer was beside the barn.
(1d) The revolver that injured the farmer was beside the barn.
This pattern of effects is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that semantic-
thematic mismatches impose a processing cost. Second, it illustrates that this cost is 
mediated by sentence structure, which we argue directs the reader’s attention away from the 
relationships established in the relative clause and focuses the reader instead on the 
information asserted in the main clause (see also Lowder & Gordon, 2013, in press). Finally, 
and most critical to the current investigation, this pattern of effects suggests that this 
paradigm is particularly well-suited for examining the processing of different types of 
inanimate nouns.
The current experiment tests the hypothesis that natural forces are processed like animate 
nouns during subject-verb integration. Specifically, this hypothesis predicts that integration 
of an inanimate subject with an action verb is easier when the subject represents a natural 
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force (e.g., tornado) than when it represents an instrument (e.g., revolver). In addition, if 
nouns referring to natural forces interact with sentence structure in the same way as do 
nouns referring to animate entities, then the difference between instruments and natural 
forces should be reduced by clausal separation as it is for inanimate and animate entities 
(Lowder & Gordon, 2012). This account predicts that instruments should cause greater 
processing difficulty than natural forces in a simple sentence context, but that this effect 
should be reduced when the action verb is deemphasized by embedding it in a relative 
clause. Obtaining this pattern of results would suggest that many cognitive and linguistic 
phenomena that have previously been attributed to animacy should instead be seen as 
resulting from perceived agency.
Method
Participants
Fifty-two native-English-speaking students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill participated in exchange for course credit.
Materials
There were 32 experimental sentences, as in (2), and 88 filler sentences. The subject of each 
experimental sentence represented either a natural force or an instrument. The subject 
combined with the action verb in either a simple-sentence context or inside a relative clause.
(2a) The tornado injured the farmer in the field beside the barn. (Natural-Simple)
(2b) The revolver injured the farmer in the field beside the barn. (Instrument-Simple)
(2c) The tornado that injured the farmer was beside the barn. (Natural-Relative 
Clause)
(2d) The revolver that injured the farmer was beside the barn. (Instrument-Relative 
Clause)
The natural forces included weather-related events (hurricane, blizzard, rain), geological 
phenomena (earthquake, mudslide, volcano), and water-related forces (river, stream, 
undertow). The instruments consisted primarily of tools (hammer, wrench, crowbar) and 
weapons (pistol, sword, machete). The natural forces and instruments did not differ in 
length, log frequency (SUBTLEXUS, Brysbaert & New, 2009), or imageability (for the 20 
natural forces and 19 instruments that appeared in the N-Watch database, Davis, 2005)1. 
The verbs expressed an action and always took as arguments an agent and a patient (carried, 
1It seems natural to wonder whether there were differences between the Natural-Force and Instrument conditions in frequency of 
occurrence for the subject-verb pairs or the subject-verb-patient combinations. This question is difficult to address given that 
sequences of specific words often do not appear at all even in very large corpora. Only 26 of our 64 subject-verb pairs (e.g., tornado 
injured; revolver injured) appeared even once in the Google N-Gram corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006), which consists of approximately 
one trillion words—a far larger language sample than any individual could possibly encounter in a lifetime of language experience. An 
alternative approach to frequency that avoids the sparse nature of corpus counts for specific word sequences is to use a method like 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997), which provides estimates of semantic similarity of words based on 
patterns of co-occurrence across multiple texts. For our materials, LSA similarity scores did not differ significantly between Natural-
Force and Instrument conditions for the subject-verb sequences (e.g., tornado/revolver injured) or the subject-verb-patient sequences 
(tornado/revolver injured the farmer). Even if LSA had shown differences it would not have provided information about whether 
those differences were due to semantic distinctions such as agency or animacy.
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wounded, damaged). The Relative-Clause condition was created by inserting the 
complementizer that between the subject and target verb, and then rewriting the remainder 
of the sentence.
Procedure
Eye-movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 system (SR Research). At the start of 
each trial, a fixation point was presented near the left edge of the monitor. Once gaze was 
steady, the experimenter presented the sentence. After reading the sentence, the participant 
pressed a key, which replaced the sentence with a true-false comprehension question (e.g., 
True or False: The tornado/revolver was beside the barn). Participants responded using a 
handheld console. Mean accuracy was 91%.
Each participant first read four of the filler sentences. After this warm-up block, the 
remaining 116 sentences were presented randomly.
Analysis
Data analysis focused on three standard measures. Gaze duration is the sum of all initial 
fixations on a region, beginning when the region is first fixated and ending when gaze is 
directed away from the region. Regression-path duration is the sum of all fixations 
beginning with the initial fixation on a region and ending when the gaze is directed away 
from the region to the right. Rereading duration is the sum of all fixations on a region that 
are not included in gaze duration. Unlike the other measures, rereading duration includes 
zeroes.
Reading times are reported for two regions of interest. The verb region (e.g., injured) was 
the main verb in the Simple-Sentence condition and the embedded verb in the Relative-
Clause condition. For this region, we implemented a contingent-expansion for the Relative-
Clause condition (Lowder & Gordon, 2012; Rayner & Duffy, 1986), such that on trials 
where the verb was skipped during first-pass reading but the complementizer was fixated, 
reading time on the complementizer was used in place of the verb. The spillover region 
(e.g., the farmer) consisted of the determiner and noun immediately following the verb.
An automatic procedure combined fixations that were shorter than 80 ms and within one 
character of another fixation into a single fixation and removed any additional fixations that 
were shorter than 80 ms, affecting 3% of the data. For all dependent measures, any 
extremely large values (exceeding 5,000 ms) were excluded (one data point). Subsequently, 
means and standard deviations were computed separately for each condition, region of 
interest, and dependent measure. Times greater than 2.5 SDs from the condition mean were 
eliminated, affecting 2.6% of the data.
Results
Verb region
Reading times are presented in Table 1. Analysis of all measures on the verb revealed main 
effects of sentence structure such that times were longer in the Simple-Sentence condition 
than the Relative-Clause condition. The effect was significant in gaze duration, F1(1,51) = 
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23.96, p < .001; F2(1,31) = 50.99, p < .001, regression-path duration, F1(1,51) = 12.29, p < .
005; F2(1,31) = 12.79, p < .005, and rereading duration, F1(1,51) = 27.90, p < .001; F2(1,31) 
= 15.73, p < .001. In addition, there were main effects of subject type in regression-path 
duration, F1(1,51) = 29.22, p < .001; F2(1,31) = 12.59, p < .005, and rereading duration, 
F1(1,51) = 9.79, p < .005; F2(1,31) = 3.91, p = .057, such that reading times were longer in 
the Instrument condition than the Natural-Forces condition.
Crucially, these main effects were qualified by interactions between sentence structure and 
subject type. The interaction was significant in regression-path duration (marginal in the 
item analysis), F1(1,51) = 4.09, p < .05; F2(1,31) = 3.40, p = .075, such that the effect of 
subject type in the Simple-Sentence condition (64 ms), t1(51) = 4.90, p < .001; t2(31) = 2.12, 
p < .05, was over twice as large as in the Relative-Clause condition (28 ms). This effect is 
illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. The interaction was fully significant in rereading 
duration, F1(1,51) = 10.75, p < .005; F2(1,31) = 4.83, p < .05, such that there was a 
significant effect of subject type in the Simple-Sentence condition, t1(51) = 4.00, p < .001; 
t2(31) = 2.66, p < .02, but no difference in the Relative-Clause condition, ts < 1.
Spillover region
Analysis of gaze duration revealed no effects. In contrast, analysis of regression-path 
duration revealed a significant main effect of sentence structure, F1(1,51) = 33.50, p < .001; 
F2(1,31) = 13.10, p < .005, such that reading times were longer for the Simple-Sentence 
condition than the Relative-Clause condition, and a significant main effect of subject type 
(marginal in the item analysis), F1(1,51) = 7.74, p < .01; F2(1,31) = 2.86, p = .10, such that 
reading times were longer in the Instrument condition than the Natural-Forces condition.
Critically, these main effects were qualified by interactions between sentence structure and 
subject type. The interaction was significant in regression-path duration, F1(1,51) = 5.62, p 
< .03; F2(1,31) = 4.49, p < .05, such that there was a significant effect of subject type in the 
Simple-Sentence condition, t1(51) = 3.62, p < .005; t2(31) = 2.40, p < .03, but no difference 
in the Relative-Clause condition, ts < 1. This effect is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 
1. The interaction was also significant in rereading duration, F1(1,51) = 6.34, p < .02; 
F2(1,31) = 4.72, p < .05, such that there was an effect of subject type in the Simple-Sentence 
condition, t1(51) = 2.43, p < .02; t2(31) = 1.98, p = .057, but not in the Relative-Clause 
condition, ts < 1.20, ps > .23.
Discussion
Although instruments and natural forces are both classes of inanimate entities, the current 
experiment demonstrated distinct processing patterns for these nouns during subject-verb 
integration. Integration of an instrument with an action verb caused early and sustained 
processing difficulty compared to integration of a natural force with an action verb. 
Importantly, this effect was robust when the action verb was the main verb but was almost 
completely eliminated when the verb was embedded in a relative clause. This pattern is 
consistent with our previous work showing that the processing of a semantic mismatch 
compared to a more straightforward interpretation depends on sentence structure (Lowder & 
Gordon, 2012, 2013, in press). In light of our previous work, these results suggest that the 
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integration of an instrument with an action verb represents a semantic mismatch that 
imposes a processing cost on the reader, whereas the integration of a natural force with an 
action verb involves a more straightforward interpretation, as has been found previously 
with animate entities.
These findings are consistent with linguistic accounts that have noted that inanimate entities 
vary with respect to their acceptability as causers of events. According to these accounts, an 
action verb, which semantically requires an animate subject, can also take certain inanimate 
subjects if they possess characteristics typically associated with agents (Dowty, 1991) or if 
they are able to generate their own energy (Wolff et al., 2009, 2010). Accordingly, subject-
verb integration is straightforward when the subject refers to an entity that is easily 
perceived as an agent (be it a human, animal, or force of nature) but is more difficult when 
the subject refers to an entity that is not easily perceived as an agent (be it an instrument, 
tool, or weapon); in these latter cases, additional processing is needed to resolve the 
mismatch between the thematic requirements of the verb and the semantic features of the 
subject. These results build on evidence that language implicitly codes information that is 
relevant to basic principles about how the world works (Brown & Fish, 1983). Language 
tends to focus the entities around us—whether animate or inanimate—that are perceived as 
agents or as causal in other ways. By doing so, linguistic encoding reinforces the importance 
of agency and causality, and provides an effective medium in which to accumulate and 
transmit cultural knowledge about how the world works.
Although a great deal of research has been presented as showing a processing advantage in 
attention, memory, and other cognitive domains for animate compared to inanimate entities 
(e.g., Abrams & Christ, 2003; Bonin et al., 2013; Capitani et al., 2003; Caramazza & 
Mahon, 2003; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Gobbini et al., 2011; Johansson, 1973; Nairne et 
al., 2013; New et al., 2007; Pratt et al., 2010; VanArsdall et al., 2014), the current results 
suggest that these effects may instead be due to the ease with which an entity is perceived as 
an agent. Demonstrations of an advantage for processing animate versus inanimate entities 
have been cited as evidence for the evolutionary pruning of the human mind to adapt to the 
primeval challenges of survival (Nairne et al, 2013; New et al., 2007). These accounts argue 
that onset of movement and unpredictable changes in behavior are key factors that 
contributed to the evolutionarily adaptive ability to selectively attend to animate over 
inanimate entities. Importantly, however, forces of nature are often characterized in the same 
way as animate beings. In cultures throughout history, the wind has been interpreted as the 
breathing of the gods, thunder as a voice, rain as tears, storms as anger (Guthrie, 1993). 
Even members of highly industrialized societies refer to forces of nature as if they are 
animate. We describe winds as “harsh” or “gentle,” volcanoes as “active” or “dormant,” seas 
as “raging” or “calm.” We make references to Mother Earth, we name hurricanes, and we 
claim to see a man in the moon. Such widespread anthropomorphism could reflect a 
genetically-encoded, adaptive focus on agency that evolved because it promoted the survival 
of primitive humans. Alternatively, it could reflect a linguistically-encoded, adaptive focus 
on the causes of events, which is intimately related to the human desire to predict actions 
and events in order to facilitate interactions with the world.
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• Natural forces are easier to integrate with action verbs than instruments.
• This effect is modulated by sentence structure.
• This pattern is similar to work that compared animate and inanimate nouns.
• Perceived agency seems to be a more important factor than animacy.
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Mean regression-path durations on the verb and spillover regions, presented as a function of 
subject type and sentence structure. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1
Eye-tracking results.
Region of Interest Condition
Measure (in milliseconds)
Gaze Duration Regression-Path Duration Rereading Duration
Verb Natural-Simple 296 349 191
Instrument-Simple 312 413 259
Natural-Relative Clause 267 325 162
Instrument-Relative Clause 268 353 159
Spillover Natural-Simple 303 403 163
Instrument-Simple 300 453 203
Natural-Relative Clause 307 363 179
Instrument-Relative Clause 314 364 159
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